The Unjust God in Christianity (and Possibly Other Faiths)

Despite what the bible and many people might say, I cannot imagine God (this whole post assumes His existence) to be as just as he is portrayed in Christianity. This is because, logically speaking, a "just" God would not throw someone in hell for eternity as a punishment for a lifetime of bad deeds. Seventy years is a long time, one hundred even longer, but both are nothing compared to eternity. As such, it does not make sense to punish someone with never ending suffering for what they did on earth for such a brief (comparatively speaking) amount of time. If God does administer never ending punishment to people who commit crimes for such a short amount of time, than I do not see how, logically speaking, God can be called just. This is because the punishment does not match the crime. Eventually, the punishment for even the most heinous crimes must end. On earth, we don't always have enough time to pay for our crimes; after death we would. As such, everyone who calls God just (as many religions do) but at the same time believes that "bad" people go to hell, and that hell is eternal, runs into a contradiction. Either God is not just, or hell is not forever.

Evolutionism: My View

I recently moved to college where I have encountered many more conservatives then I have ever been acquainted with before. Myself, I am extremely liberal, and while I have no problem with other people's viewpoints I find it a little unsettling to be surrounded by so many individuals with believes that are so different from mine. One area where our ideas differ is in the sphere of religion. I was raised Catholic and while I still attend church, I would definitively not say that I agree with all of its teachings. Most of my conservative friends, however, put a huge importance on God. They also overwhelmingly reject the theory of evolution. Of course, I am not saying that all conservatives reject that theory, only that those conservatives I am acquainted with at my school mostly do. This, however, I find very troubling. It is is strange in the face of so much archeological evidence people can tell me that evolution did not occur; that the earth is only a few thousand of years old. Heck, I even had one friend tell me that there isn't any concrete evidence supporting evolution!

From one angle, I see where my friends are coming from. They were raised very christian- tough to believe everything in the bible. As such, they are unlikely to believe anything that goes against their viewpoint. Instead, they shut it out as nonsense. That is a perfectly normal human response. After all, it is hard to believe something that goes against everything that you have been tough. In my friends minds  believing in evolution equates with not believing in God. I just want to simply point out that it is possible to believe in God and an earth that is billions of years old. Heck, that is my belief. If you believe in a God that is all powerful, what is there to stop him from creating a world where evolution occurs? Maybe, not everything in the bible is literal. While I believe that the old testament is simply fairy tales, it is possible that it is just representative of some other events; maybe it is a metaphor. It is possible for God to exist, the old testament to be true and evolution to be a fact! They do not need to be mutually exclusive.

Free Will vs Determinism... An Argument for Free Will

This was originally an essay I wrote for my Philosophy class. It might be worth noting that while I argue for free will in this piece, I am now more inclined to believe in determinism.       

          The problem of free will and determinism is one of the fundamental issues of philosophy. To fully understand its nature we need to explore the different forms of both determinism and free will. Determinism is the belief that all events are caused by prior events, and that there is only one possible course of events that can occur at any given moment. To better grasp the two major forms of determinism, hard and soft determinism, we must first discuss the two differing definitions of free will. The libertarian definition of free will asserts that a person acts freely if his or her actions are performed without coercion and constrain and when the person could have acted otherwise (implying that with a belief in libertarian free will there is a number of possible events that can occur). This definition is in slight disagreement with the compatibilist definition of free will which, like the libertarian definition, asserts that a free act is one in which a person performs a deed without coercion and constrain but, in contrast to the libertarian definition, where all actions and choices are caused by prior events where the person could not have acted otherwise. This definition of free will is consistent with soft determinism which asserts the coexistence of determinism and free will. Hard determinism, on the other hand, asserts the existence of determinism but does not allow for the existence of free will. Personally, I am a believer in libertarian free will.

           The cause of my belief in libertarian free will stems from the human ability to feel regret. For the purposes of the argument I think it is safe to assume that almost every person on the planet has at one point or another felt regret. Regret in of itself is a powerful argument for free will. By admitting regret human beings virtually admit that they could have acted otherwise in a specific situation. With that, they are basically implying that they had a choice between what they choose and what they could have chosen. Therefore, by admitting regret humans are basically admitting free will. That is because the ability to choose between two choices, which regret implies, is one of the two fundamental conditions of free will. However, in my mind, regret also points toward the supremacy of the libertarian definition of free will over the compatibilist definition of free will. I say so because the compatibilist definition of free will asserts that human action is determined by past events, and therefore that a person could not have acted otherwise then they did. Hence, if one assumes compatibilist free will he or she has no reason to feel regret because in the end there was nothing they could have done to avoid making the decision they made. Therefore, in my mind, by feeling regret humans not only support free will but also support the supremacy of libertarian free will over compatibilist free will.

           However, opponents of this thesis might say that just because our belief in regret supports libertarian free will, that does not necessarily mean that we have free will. After all, it is possible that we have what I call an illusion of free will. It is possible for us to feel as though we have free will, and thus act as though we do, but still have all our choices predetermined with no way of changing their outcome. After all, even the most hardened determinist would have to concede that humans, for the most part, assume free will. Therefore, if one is a determinist living in a world where humans assume free will it should be no surprise that humans act as though free will was a fact, and thus feel regret. Hence, the most powerful argument against the argument from regret could be the statement that regret simply is human nature. Most human beings believe in free will and therefore they will naturally regret their (seemingly) incorrect decisions, even if determinism is true. Another argument against my assertion could be made by proponents of compatibilist free will who can claim that it does not matter whether there are any other possible outcomes to our actions, but rather only whether our actions are free. They can argue that since we committed the incorrect action of our own free will (without coercion) it does not matter whether we could have ever picked another action since the mistake we made was made freely by us. Thus believers in compatibilist free will can on the basis of this counterargument still allow for the existence of regret in everyday life.

           While these two are surely valid counterarguments to my thesis, in the great scheme of things they are not powerful enough to overshadow the arguments they attempt to counter. The free will illusion argument is not concrete enough to really be taken seriously. Sure it is possible that we do not have free will despite our perception of it, however by the same token it might be possible that no people other then us exist and that all people we meet are only figments of our infinitive imagination. While the second assertion here presented is much more unlikely then the first, the two follow a similar logical pattern. After all, if our perception of free will can be an illusion then so can be our perception of anything else. Therefore, while the argument from illusion is not impossible, it is highly unlikely, and as such it is better to believe in free will then to support the argument from illusion. The argument made by those who believe in compatibilist free will about the existence of regret, at least on the surface, seems more plausible. In order to test it, one must consider whether regret really has to do solely with choosing an action freely or, as I earlier asserted, also with the fact that there can be a number of possible options we can choose from. It is true that an action committed freely can cause regret in humans even if soft determinism is true. However, the question we should ask ourselves is whether that is logically sound? By blaming themselves for doing something that they know they could not have avoided, believers of compatibilist free will are committing a logical error. It simply does not make sense to feel bad about something that could not have possibly ever been avoided. Therefore, the fact that any determinist can feel regret is logically contradictory. From a purely human standpoint the argument brought forth for supporters of compatibilist free will rings true. If you did something wrong you have the right to regret it even if you couldn't have acted otherwise. However, logically speaking one should not regret an action that could not have been avoided. There is no such logical contradictions when one considers libertarian free will. For that reason I am more inclined to belief in libertarian free will over compatibilist free will.